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Purpose. 
 
Iran has been ranked by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial 
Action Task Force as one of the foremost countries in the world for money laundering. 
However, Iranian banks claim that they comply with international standards for reporting 
suspicious activity, risk management, and training. We investigate this dichotomy 
between perception and reality.  
 
Design. 
 
A Wolfsberg-style questionnaire was sent to partners in Iranian accounting firms which 
have audited domestic banks over the past five years to investigate the adequacy of risk 
management systems.  
 
Findings. 
 
Most Iranian banks have anti-money laundering systems which compare favourably with 
those of international counterparties. Banks take a risk-based approach to potential 
criminal behaviour. The negative perception of Iranian banks is principally attributable to 
the government’s unwillingness to accede to ‘touchstone’ international conventions. 
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Despite having in place anti-money laundering laws which are comparable in intent with 
those of the United Kingdom and the United States, weak enforcement remains a 
significant impediment of which the political establishment is aware. 
 
Originality/value. 
 
The research provides a unique insight into the extent of anti-money laundering 
compliance in Iranian banks as verified by external auditors.  
 
Practical implications. 
 
Measures required to bring Iranian banks into compliance with international standards 
may be less extensive than perceptions suggest. However, failure of the government to 
accede to conventions stipulated by the FATF mean that banks may remain ostracised 
by foreign counterparties for the foreseeable future.  
 
 
Keywords: Money laundering. Iranian banks. Financial Action Task Force. Wolfsberg 
Group. Audit. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Iran has been associated with money laundering by  the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (achieving ‘first place’ in the Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index of 2017), 
and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and this has negatively impacted upon the 
ability of its banks to form associations with foreign counterparties (Rahmdel, 2018). 
These problems are in addition to an international sanctions regime to which the country 
is subject. It is also on a FATF blacklist (with North Korea) of countries which do not 
comply with its anti-money laundering (AML) requirements (Sharman, 2009). This is 
mainly attributable to the country’s failure to accede to two international conventions:  the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo 
Convention), and the Terrorist Financing Convention of 1999 (formerly the International 
Convention for the Suppression and Financing of Terrorism) (Compin, 2018). The FATF 
requires countries to criminalise terrorist financing, including removing the exemption for 
designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”. 
However, the Iranian government does not recognise Lebanon’s Hizbullah as a terrorist 
organisation, nor Iraq’s Hashado Shabi, nor Yemen’s Ansarollah, notwithstanding that 
they are so designated by the FATF, the EU and the US. This divergence has contributed 
to the country’s blacklisting; it is attributable to a political decision and not to risk 
management weaknesses in the banking sector. There is therefore greater nuance 
between perception and reality than initial impressions would suggest. Iran does have a 
significant and persistent problem with money laundering, mainly arising from the illegal 
narcotics trade and political corruption. The purpose of this paper is to investigate 
whether, paradoxically, banks meet in whole or in part international expectations and that 
weaknesses reside elsewhere, principally inadequate enforcement of domestic legislation 
as well as an unwillingness to accede to international conventions. Previous research by 
Salehi and Molla Imeny (2019) found that Iranian banks have adequate AML internal 
systems and protocols. A limitation of the work was that it investigated banks’ perceptions 
of themselves, and the results were not verified by an independent third party. However, 
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these provide a comparative reference point for this paper in terms of its methodology in 
illuminating how banks perceive their own AML compliance compared with how others- 
independent auditors- report the reality. This paper provides this independent 
assessment. 
Auditor opinion of AML compliance in financial institutions has been previously drawn 
upon in academic research by Gaganis and Pasiouras (2007). This paper adopts a similar 
approach, its originality deriving from the fact that the Wolfsberg Questionnaire which has 
traditionally been used by banks to evaluate counterparty risk has instead been 
completed by auditors. We found the reality to be that internal systems relating to risk 
management, training, and suspicious activity reporting in Iranian banks are more in 
accord with international expectations than perception might otherwise suggest. The 
research question can be stated thus:  to what extent do Iranian banks as verified by 
independent auditors comply with the Wolfsberg Principles for the detection and 
prevention of money laundering? The answer is important in Iran’s efforts to achieve 
removal from the FATF blacklist, but also to governments of other countries which are 
deemed non-compliant with FATF standards (Buchanan, 2004). A body such as the FATF 
which concerns itself with governments’ adherence to international conventions may, 
paradoxically, certify a country to be in compliance and safe against the risk of money 
laundering when in fact it is not if its domestic banks are the weak point in the chain 
(Gnutzmann et al., 2010). If banks are deemed safe according to the Wolfsberg 
Principles, then changes to domestic laws should hasten quicker removal from the 
blacklist. The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a literature 
review. Section 3 examines systemic weaknesses in the Iranian banking system as 
identified by the Financial Action Task Force. Section 4 explains the paper’s methodology 
and provides its empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
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Section 2. Literature review 
 
Money laundering may be defined as the attempt to disguise the origin of illegally obtained 
earnings and its movement into the legitimate financial system in such a way that it can 
be used by beneficiaries without attracting the attention of regulatory or confiscatory 
authorities (Lehman and Okcabol, 2005; Guenin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010; Humphrey 
and Owen, 2000). Certain accounting practices make money laundering possible and 
have been discussed in the literature (Arnold and Sikka, 2001; Neu et al., 2013). Mitchell 
et al. (1998) have also described how accounting firms make money laundering possible, 
although outright collusion in criminal activity, for example through the setting up of sham 
corporate structures, would be illegal. For Kerry and Brown (1992 at p. 594), money 
laundering is not conceived by wicked individuals; ‘Rather it is planned, executed, 
minuted and concealed in clean, respectable, warm and well-lit city centre offices’. For 
Compin (2008, at p. 594), ‘Accounting provides sophisticated support to the criminal 
approach and serves as a risk minimization tool. The technique becomes the 
smokescreen, allowing financial communications to be given a positive spin to meet the 
required standards’. Traditionally money laundering has been defined as comprising three 
stages: placement, layering, and integration (Schneider and Windischbauer, 2008). 
Placement is the first attempt to integrate illegal earnings into the financial system and 
may involve adding the proceeds of crime to legitimate takings. Layering is the repeated 
use of placement and extraction through many transactions and is the first concerted 
attempt at concealment. Integration is when money can be withdrawn from the financial 
system without attracting the attention of law enforcement agencies or tax authorities. 
Despite these differentiations, it is a process rather than a series of distinct events.  
Financial institutions can be accessories to money laundering, either deliberately or 
accidentally (Levi and Reuter, 2006). The latter would arise for example when banks have 
flawed internal controls or reporting systems regarding suspicious activities, or  have 
inadequate training to enable employees to recognise ‘red flags’ or indicators of money 
laundering which will then be reported to management and ultimately to the board, or to 
a designated reporting officer within the bank (Webb, 2004). Or it may be that the bank 
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has inadequate ‘know your customer’ protocols or does not manage the risk of criminality 
(Gullkvist and Jokipii, 2013). These are systemic considerations which exist alongside 
domestic legal frameworks. For example, laws may require that suspicious transactions 
are reported to state agents in the form of Suspicious Activity Reports or SARs (Harvey, 
2008). Or they may provide for the seizure and confiscation of money or assets which are 
suspected to be linked to criminal activity. An example of statutory provision for the 
seizure of assets suspected of having been acquired from illegal money is the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Recently the UK introduced Unexplained 
Wealth Orders which are issued by domestic courts to compel the person against whom 
they are issued to reveal the sources of assets of disproportionate value relative to, for 
example, earnings. If they fail to do so the National Crime Agency is empowered to apply 
to the High Court for the assets to be seized. The Patriot Act 2001 in the United States 
has similar provisions for the seizure of assets deemed to have been obtained through 
illegal activity. Iran has similar legislation; for example, Article 49 of the Constitution 
provides for the seizure of illegally obtained assets, while the Anti-Money Laundering Law 
of 2008 imposes suspicious activity reporting obligations upon bankers, lawyers, and 
auditors.  
For Takats (2011), banks should face fines when they fail to report money laundering. 
But excessive fines can lead banks to report transactions which are less suspicious, 
which can in turn overwhelm the reporting system. This phenomenon of over-reporting 
has been noted in research by Norton (2018). Naheem  (2016) noted that banks must 
deal with increasingly sophisticated laundering techniques. Historically governments 
have addressed the crime through national regulations which in most cases have arisen 
because of the state’s focus on prevention of the trade in illegal narcotics. However, as 
other criminal activities are now financed with laundered funds, including the purchase of 
armaments, political corruption and bribery, the regulatory system has similarly expanded 
and there is now the added social obligation on banks, lawyers and accountants to 
support the state in detecting criminal activity (Mitchell et al., 1998; Mulig and Smith, 
2004). Banks can become unwitting providers of services to customers whose credentials 
appear unimpeachable. For example, a customer may convert illegal moneys through the 
purchase of high value assets such as real estate, antiques, paintings, precious metals, 
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and then use this as security deposited with a bank to support a loan made to a company 
owned either directly or indirectly by the criminal (Zdanowicz, 2009). The money appears 
as a loan in the company’s balance sheet but unbeknown to investigators, it will only have 
been made because the borrower/criminal has been able to provide collateral: the 
proceeds of illegal activity. Indeed, the borrower may appear simply as the recipient 
company: the criminal’s name will not appear anywhere, even though they have provided 
the collateral underpinning the transaction. In developing countries like Iran, the reality is 
that the purchase of such high value assets will be beyond the resources of a substantial 
part of the population. Instead, such purchasing behaviour will be within the capacity of 
the political, military, or social elite. For this reason recent FATF recommendations have 
required banks and other cash-handling businesses such as brokers, casinos, and real 
estate agents to pay additional attention when the client is a Political Exposed Person 
such as a high-ranking public official, a former judge, politician, or military official (Choo, 
2008).  
Another common method of laundering in developing countries involves cash shipments 
by boat or plane to several banks by couriers or smurfs, equating to the placement stage 
of laundering. An agent will then move the funds into the personal accounts of overseas 
intermediaries, each of whom arranges to transfer the funds back into the country into 
accounts at the national central bank, which would then grant authorisation. The criminal 
then cancels the transfers and the funds drawn in cash from the intermediary’s account 
are then wired back in country to other accounts, using the authorisation from the national 
central bank to explain the origin of funds (Quirk, 1997). In this way the central bank is 
giving legitimacy to illegal drug money. The moneys are then used to purchase assets 
such as real estate, this forming part of the integration stage of the process. Money 
laundering in Iran shares many of these characteristics and has become a concern to 
national politicians and officials, including a former head of the state Central Bank, as will 
be seen next.  
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Section 3. Iran and FATF AML requirements 
 
Money laundering in developing countries such as Iran can have different characteristics 
to the same crime in developed economies where levels of sophistication are higher and 
the wherewithal of criminals is greater to make use of intermediaries such as accountants, 
lawyers, brokers and real estate purchasers (Veng Mei Long, 2007). Developing countries 
tend to have weak anti-money laundering (AML) laws, limited operational independence 
of financial intelligence units (FIUs), absence of protection of whistleblowers, and limited 
penalties for those convicted of the crime (Everrett, 2007). Sohraby et al.(2016) found 
that Iran has proper bank regulations for customer due diligence, record keeping and 
reporting, to combat money laundering. Rahmdel (2018) also suggested that Iran’s AML 
regulations comply with FATF recommendations and international standards. But there is 
very limited enforcement of these regulations or effective oversight by the FIU (Sohraby 
et al., 2016; Keesoony, 2016). These limitations, combined with an absence of effective 
AML training for professionals, result in an increase in banking fraud and money 
laundering in Iran according to Rezaee and Davani (2013).  
In 2017 Pedram Soltani, former Vice President of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, 
confirmed the government’s estimate for annual money laundering to be $35 billion: other 
sources put the figure closer to $42 billion. In an interview on state television in 2019 the 
legal adviser to President Rouhani, Jonaidi, stated: “The money from organised crime or 
drug trafficking is now an integral element within the banking system and we do not know 
the source and destination of money from organised crimes.” The smuggling of goods is 
also a major source of illegal earnings, with at least 40% of imported goods coming in 
through this method. Failure to return dollars earned from exports is a major component 
of money laundering activity. Amir Hemmati, Head of Iran’s Central Bank, observed in an 
interview on state television in November 2019:  “Since the beginning of the year, we had 
$27 billion worth of non-oil exports, but less than $7 billion is back to the system, and I 
don’t know where the rest of it is.” According to a Statement issued by the FATF in 
February 2019, Iranian AML legislation suffers from several deficiencies which facilitate 
this degree of illegality. The country had previously embarked upon an action plan to meet 
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FATF requirements and to address these concerns, but this expired in January 2018. In 
February 2019, the FATF noted that there were issues which had not been addressed 
satisfactorily, including failure to adequately criminalise terrorist financing or to ratify the 
Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions.  
In February 2020 the FATF called on all jurisdictions to impose effective countermeasures 
on Iran such as requiring financial institutions to review, amend, or if necessary terminate 
correspondent relationships with Iranian banks or limiting business relationships or 
financial transactions with Iran (Tang and Ai, 2010; Gardner, 2007). These 
countermeasures were to be developed and implemented to protect the international 
financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation 
financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from Iran. The FATF indicated in the Statement 
that it recognised Iran’s legislative efforts to implement anti-money laundering and 
countering of financing terrorism polices, but the failure to implement the conventions was 
the main reason for its inclusion on the list of High Risk Jurisdictions which are Subject to 
a Call for Action. The Statement continued: 
 “Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with 
respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain 
concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses 
to the international financial system”.  
 
Despite these criticisms and the imposition of countermeasures by the FATF to effectively 
insulate the international financial system against the risk of money laundering from Iran, 
the perception of a legal vacuum is tempered by the reality that the country has had in 
place significant AML laws for several decades, as well as provision for the seizure of 
illegally obtained assets (Malakoutikhah, 2020). These include Article 49 of the 
Constitution, Article 662 of the Islamic Penal Code 1996, and the Executive By-Law of 
the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009. Although the legislative framework applicable to 
money laundering has similarities with comparable legislation in the UK and US, it falls 
short in terms of enforcement. When a country’s domestic laws are flawed, either in 
design or in implementation, then risk management systems of domestic banks take on 
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added significance for international agencies and potential counterparties if these 
deficiencies are to be worked around. Auditors of such banks are best placed to provide 
impartial evaluation of the effectiveness of such systems.  
 
Section 4. methodology and investigation 
 
The Wolfsberg Group is an association of thirteen global banks set up in 2000 to develop 
frameworks and guidelines  for the management of financial crime risks particularly with 
regard to know your customer, money laundering, and terrorist financing (Aiolfi and 
Bauer, 2012; Pieth and Aiolfi, 2003; van Erp et al., 2015). The Group aims to evolve over 
time principles of good practice for AML in banks. The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering 
Principles for Private Banking were published in October 2000, revised in May 2002, and 
again most recently in June 2012. The Group does not advocate a standardised ‘one size 
fits all’ approach to risk management, and accordingly its documents and guidelines are 
intended to enable financial institutions to identify their own unique risks given the 
businesses with which they interact, their geographical location, and the regulatory 
competencies of domestic agencies (Ay, 2018; Mabunda, 2018). Risk management 
strategies will vary in different contexts (Simonova, 2011). The important requirement is 
that banks should be able to identify the risks to which they are subject and develop their 
own management strategies, drawing upon the Group’s guidelines (de Koker, 2009). 
Financial Institutions should not simply adopt each publication, but instead consider the 
risks described, the applicable regulatory standards, and their own risk management 
strategy as a response. The Group launched the Correspondent Banking Due Diligence 
Questionnaire (CBDDQ) in 2018 covering the major aspects of banks’ financial crime 
programmes (AML, ABC and Sanctions), and is designed to be an enhanced and 
reasonable standard for cross-border and/or other higher risk Correspondent Banking 
Due Diligence, reducing to a minimum any additional data requirements, as per the 
Wolfsberg definition and current FATF Guidance (Flohr, 2014). Supporting materials have 
been designed to aid ‘capacity building’ in the industry and support the objectives of the 
G20 and other supranational organisations towards a well supervised and more 
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harmonised regulatory standard in the correspondent banking space. This paper has 
drawn upon the Wolfsberg Questionnaire in designing a comparable document to be 
administered, not to Iranian banks, but instead to the auditors who audit them. Melnik 
(2000) has criticised the inadequate use made of auditors by the United States 
government in its fight against money laundering; the use of auditors in this research is 
warranted given the weight which can be assigned to their opinions as expressed in our 
questionnaire. The Group issued a standard questionnaire in 2014 for evaluating banks’ 
AML procedures. It consists of six sections. The first section deals with AML policies, 
practices, and procedures within banks. The second evaluates risk assessment 
procedures. The third examines protocols regarding know your customer, simple due 
diligence and enhanced due diligence procedures. The fourth concerns the adequacy of 
procedures for identification of transactions involving illegally obtained funds and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions. The fifth takes transaction monitoring further, whilst 
the final section concerns internal AML training programmes. We used the questionnaire 
as the basis for our enquiry of auditors of Iranian banks. 
 
4.1 The Wolfsberg Questionnaire 
 
The Wolfsberg Questionnaire has been traditionally used by banks to assess the 
robustness of internal risk management systems, particularly those of potential 
counterparties (Iken and Agudelo, 2017). This research takes an innovative and original 
approach by not inviting Iranian banks to complete it as was previously done in a paper 
by  Salehi and Molla Imeny (2019), but instead by auditors who have audited such banks 
within the past five years. This has not previously been done in comparable research. 
The objective is to obtain an independent evaluation of internal risk management systems 
from an impartial source (Jeppesen, 2019). In 2019, 35 banks and credit institutions 
received authorisation from the Central Bank of Iran (the list of authorised institutions is 
available  at https://www.cbi.ir/simplelist/1462.aspx). Over the past five years, 16 firms 
audited these authorised banks and credit institutions (we excluded the Audit 
Organization from  the list to whom the questionnaire was sent because, as a 
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governmental organisation, there was a risk that its managers’ answers could be biased). 
Accordingly, the research sample consisted of 138 partners employed in 15 audit firms. 
36 questionnaires (or 26 per cent of research sample) were returned completed. The 
Wolfsberg Questionnaire comprises nine questions about general AML policies and 
procedures in banks, two questions about risk assessment, six questions about customer 
due diligence, five questions about detection and reporting of suspicious transactions, 
one question about transaction monitoring, and five questions about AML training. 
Regarding each question we used a Likert scale instead of a yes/no option to increase 
the range of possible responses available to respondents. 
 
4.2 Research variables 
 
 
We used two variables in our methodology. First, as an independent variable and for 
comparative purposes, we drew upon results in Salehi and Molla Imeny’s (2019) paper 
regarding self-perceptions in Iranian banks regarding the adequacy of their internal AML 
systems. Second, as a dependent variable we utilised auditors’ perceptions of the AML 
performance of the banks which they have previously audited, based upon the Wolfsberg 
criteria. We then compared the results to see if they were the same, in which case both 
banks and auditors agree that international AML expectations are being met, or whether 
they differed, in which case the banks have an untrue or unrealistic perception of their 
own performance. The Wolfsberg Group has issued standards for a range of factors 
including customer identification, due diligence, dealing with financial institutions based 
in offshore jurisdictions, politically exposed persons, and suspicious activity reporting 
(Haynes, 2004). International banks use the Group’s Questionnaire to assess a 
correspondent bank’s AML status (Iken and Agudelo, 2017). Kutubi (2011) and Salehi 
and Molla Imeny (2019) used the questionnaire to investigate AML practices in a sample 
of banks. This variable registered 1 if auditors answered “definitely no”, 2 if they answered 
“no”, 3 if they answered “maybe”, 4 if they answered “yes”, and 5 if they answered 
“definitely yes”. Its purpose was to determine the extent to which banks met the Wolfsberg 
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criteria. The findings from this previous research provide the independent variable against 
which we compared, in the present research, auditors’ opinion as to the correctness or 
otherwise of these views as held by the banks of themselves. Salehi and Molla Imeny’s 
research indicated that Iranian banks were of the general view that their own internal AML 
systems were satisfactory and met international expectations. Auditors’ opinions of these 
self-perceptions are examined here by reference to criteria used in the Wolfsberg 
Questionnaire, and as such constitutes the dependent variable in this research (AML 
status of Iranian banks, or AMLS, in the following tables). Banks’ claims (CLAIM) as an 
independent variable was extracted from previous research by Salehi and Molla Imeny 
(2019) in which Iranian banks were asked to evaluate their own internal systems by 
completing a questionnaire based upon the Wolfsberg criteria. These responses were 
compared with the dependent variable of this research, this being auditor appraisal of the 
extent to which banks’ perceptions of their own internal practices comply with the 
Wolfsberg criteria. 
 
4.3  Findings and discussion 
 
 
Table 1 comprises two panels. The frequency and percentage of responses are 
presented in panel A of table 1. 
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Table 1 
Sample Statistics 
  AML PPP  RA  KYC  STR  TM  Training    Whole 
  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %  Freq. %     Freq. Freq. 
Panel A:Frequency and 
percentage of responses 
about AML status of 
Iranian banks (second 
section of the 
questionnaire) 
 
               
Categories:                         
 Definitely no  3 0.8  1 1.4  0 0.0  3 1.7  0 0.0  0 0.0     7 0.7 
 No  62 17.2  18 25.0  40 18.5  24 13.3  8 22.2  16 11.1     168 16.6 
 Maybe  105 29.2  19 26.4  61 28.2  63 35.0  8 22.2  42 29.2     298 29.6 
 Yes  121 33.6  28 38.9  86 39.8  65 36.1  16 44.4  71 49.3     387 38.4 
 Definitely yes  69 19.2  6 8.3  29 13.5  25 13.9  4 11.2  15 10.4     148 14.7 
                          
                  
Panel B: Main statistics of 
dependent variables 
 
N  Mean  Median  Stdev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Min  Max 
AMLS  1,008*  3.497  4.000  0.959  -0.177  2.250  1.000  5.000 
                 
                  
AML PPP: general AML policies, practices and procedures (first section of the Wolfsberg 
questionnaire with 10 questions). RA:  risk assessment (second section of the Wolfsberg 
questionnaire with 2 questions). KYC: know your customer, due diligence, and enhanced due 
diligence (third section of the Wolfsberg questionnaire with 6 questions). STR: reportable 
transactions and prevention and detection of transactions with illegally obtained funds (fourth 
section of the Wolfsberg questionnaire with 5 questions). TM: transaction monitoring (fifth section 
of the Wolfsberg questionnaire with one question). Training:  AML training (sixth section of the 
Wolfsberg questionnaire with 4 questions). Whole: AML status of banks as a whole (sum of 
questions in each section which is equal to 28 questions).AMLS: anti-money laundering status of 
Iranian banks. 
* We asked 28 questions of 36 auditors, making the number of observations for the AMLS variable 
1,008. 
 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the frequency and percentage of responses to the second 
section of the questionnaire for five categories of “definitely no”, “no”, “maybe”, “yes”, and 
“definitely yes”. In this panel, the AML status of Iranian banks is presented taking into 
consideration six areas as distinguished in the Wolfsberg Questionnaire. These areas are 
1) general AML policies, practices and procedures; 2) risk assessment; 3) know your 
customer, due diligence, and enhanced due diligence; 4) reportable transactions and 
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prevention and detection of transactions with illegally obtained funds; 5) transaction 
monitoring; and 6) AML training. 
As panel A of Table 1 shows, the AML risk management capacity of Iranian banks is 
good. Only 0.7 per cent of respondents indicated that they definitely do not meet the 
Wolfsberg AML criteria. Most of the auditor respondents (82 per cent) verified that Iranian 
banks have AML policies, practices and procedures. 73.6 per cent of these respondents 
confirmed that Iranian banks assess their customers’ risk or potentiality for criminal 
behaviour. 81.5 per cent believed that Iranian banks investigate their customers’ true 
identity and conduct either simple or enhanced due diligence checks if necessary. Most 
of the respondents were of the view that the Iranian banks which they audited monitored 
their customers’ transactions (77.8 per cent) and if they find a suspicious transaction, they 
then report it to the relevant authorities (85 per cent). Most of the respondents (88.9 per 
cent) believe Iranian banks provide rigorous and effective AML training. Generally, 82.7 
per cent of respondents believe that Iranian banks meet the Wolfsberg criteria in their 
AML systems. The main statistics for dependent variables are summarised in panel B of 
Table 1. The mean and median of the AML status of Iranian banks are 3.50 and 4.00 
respectively. The distribution of this variable is also left-skewed (-0.18), indicating that the 
distribution is concentrated in numbers higher than the mean. Accordingly, it suggests 
that respondents believe Iranian banks satisfy most of the AML controls and procedures 
as stipulated by the Wolfsberg Group. 
Table 2 addresses the focus of this paper: a comparison between banks’ claims and 
auditors’ opinion about the extent of the former’s compliance with AML expectations. To 
this end we assume the mean and median of banks’ responses are equal to the mean 
and median of auditors’ responses. There are different statistical methods for testing the 
equality of mean and median between two independent groups: we use some of these 
and present the results in Table 2.This shows the results of all tests for equality of means 
and proves that there is no difference between Iranian banks’ claims and auditors’ opinion 
about the AML status of Iranian banks. The banks believe that they comply with 
international AML expectations as covered in the Wolfsberg Questionnaire, and this view 
is independently confirmed by auditors also working to the Wolfsberg criteria. Although 
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the results of Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the assumption of equality of 
medians, they are not significant at 1 per cent. Furthermore, the results of Chi-square and 
van der Waerden tests do not reject the proposition that the banks and auditors agree on 
a satisfactory level of compliance. Therefore, we conclude the medians of both groups 
are equal, with the result that Iranian banks’ claim about their AML compliance are 
consistent with auditors’ opinion. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Research hypothesis test 
H0: 𝜇𝐴𝑀𝐿𝑆 = 𝜇𝐶𝐿𝐴𝐼𝑀  Method 
 Value  Prob. 
  t-test  1.391  0.170 
  Satterthwaite-Welch t-test  1.391  0.172 
  Anova F-test  1.934  0.170 
  Welch F-test  1.934  0.172 
       
H0: 𝑀𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐿𝑆 = 𝑀𝐷𝐶𝐿𝐴𝐼𝑀   
    
  Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney  1.975  0.048* 
  Med. Chi-square  1.788  0.181 
  Kruskal-Wallis  3.931  0.047* 
  van der Waerden  3.055  0.080 
   
      
* significant at 5% 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has evaluated three dimensions to money laundering in Iran. First, there is the 
behaviour of the government in the international context. The principal reason for the 
inclusion of Iran in the FATF blacklist is the country’s unwillingness to accede to two 
international conventions applicable to money laundering and terrorist financing: the 
Palermo and Anti-Terrorist Financing Conventions. For the FATF these conventions 
represent the touchstone of a country’s commitment to combatting these two crimes. 
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Second, perception of weaknesses in Iranian laws, particularly regarding a general lack 
of enforcement, is borne out in reality: statements made in the political domain point 
towards laws which are failing to counteract money laundering. This heightens the need 
for banks to be robust in their own internal risk management systems if they are, in time, 
to form associations with international counterparties. If these are not satisfied with the 
efficacy of domestic laws, there will be higher expectations of Iranian partners to 
overcome such shortcomings. This leads to the paper’s principal focus:  auditors’ 
independent appraisal of the effectiveness of AML systems in Iranian banks. Here the 
research finds grounds for cautious optimism. These banks do appear to have adequate 
risk management systems and AML training. Although the country has refused to sign up 
to the Palermo and ATF Conventions, internal risk management systems in its banks 
appear to comply to a satisfactory extent with the expectations of international 
counterparties, based upon the Wolfsberg criteria.  
For as long as Iran refuses to accede to the Conventions it will remain on the FATF 
blacklist. Sharman (2009) has shown how such blacklisting can result in damage to 
states’ reputations among investors, thus producing pressure to comply through fear of 
actual or anticipated capital flight. To be removed from blacklists generally, and thereby 
to prevent future economic damage, those targeted have had to comply with stringent 
regulatory standards mandated by international organisations (Hendriyetty and Grewal, 
2018). The divergence between Iran on the one hand and the FATF, EU, and the US on 
the other as to what constitutes a terrorist organisation also means that Iran will not be 
removed from the FATF blacklist for the foreseeable future. For Hulsse (at p459) 
‘Coercion is successful at securing formal compliance only, which has little effect on the 
problems that the rules are supposed to solve. The main advantage of legitimation, in 
comparison, is not that it is relatively inexpensive, but that it is able to secure actual 
compliance’. If Iran accedes to the Conventions, the risk is that its compliance will be 
formal and tokenistic rather than genuine and supported with enforcement. Sharman and 
Chaikin (2009) have demonstrated that, although powerful outsiders have successfully 
diffused AML systems among developing countries, a lack of a sense of ‘ownership’ in 
the latter explains why these systems are often established only as tokens to enhance 
international legitimacy and reputations. This view coincides with that of Johnson and Lim 
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(2003), who questioned whether the FATF has made a difference in terms of achieving 
genuine compliance with its requirements. 
If and when Iran leaves the blacklist and the international sanctions regime is either 
ameliorated or dismantled, then re-establishing relations between Iranian banks and 
foreign counterparties may prove relatively easy and quick to achieve, given that internal 
risk management systems are already at a satisfactory level. If the national FIU is also 
weak in terms of being underfunded, or not sufficiently independent of the state, then 
verification as to robustness of internal risk management systems is better undertaken by 
independent auditors. In terms of domestic AML laws Iran has made substantial progress 
in a relatively short period of time as confirmed by the FATF, but further progress is 
needed. Regarding internal AML practices and procedures, this paper finds that contrary 
to perception, the reality is that Iranian banks are to a significant extent meeting the 
Wolfsberg criteria. In so doing, the future expectations of potential international 
counterparties may be easier to satisfy than present perceptions might suggest.  
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